Abstract-In this paper we describe a model for the activation level of users in online dating platforms (ODPs). Such popular systems are conceived in order to match individuals from two groups of potential mates. The business of such platforms pivots around the customers' expectancy to get in contact with their future dates: upon the payment of a fee to the platform owner, ODPs provide specific tools to improve reach and visibility However, ODPs require a critical number of active users in order to sustain their operations (and their business). Customers of the platform trade off on the price for being more visible and attract mates' contacts. A user becomes inactive if he or she is not contacted by others for some time: being contacted by potential mates acts as an activation signal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The first online dating platforms (ODP) appeared during the 1990's and introduced online dating as an Internet service. Subscribers of such platforms access first a portal and create their own profile. By using the ODP, they seek for matches among the profiles of potential peer mates.
Beyond the over 5000 ODP platforms worldwide, the premier ODP websites in this domain are Match.com, OkCupid, and PlentyofFish. More recently, mobile dating apps have appeared to support the online dating market. Nowadays, ODP users can do everything from browsing profiles to setting up real-time dates conveniently from their smartphones. E.g., in April 2014, Match.com shipped the "Stream" location-based application.
According to recent surveys [1] "Taken together, 11% of all American adults have used either an online dating site or a mobile dating app and are classified as online daters."
In practice, the typical platform provides multiple service levels including various optional tools such as chatrooms, webcam calls or profile acceleration tools for ODP subscribers. reach, e.g., by directly contacting potential mates, or becoming more visible in search results. Such optional tools require to pay a certain fee to the platform owner. Typically, the prototype ODP also provides information of potential matches by showing the tagged user with the username of the most recently registered community members, messages addressing the tagged user, the names of the most recent users who have browsed the tagged users profile. Also, such systems have recommenders' functionality to hint the names of mates which best match the tagged user; to this aim a notion of similarity is assessed through self-reported preferences over a set of predefined variables.
In Fig. 1 we have reported a typical dashboard presented to an ODP subscriber. We can identify there a search menu to perform search operations, an email menu to retrieve messages from peers through platform owned emails, a recommendation menu to check for best matches, and a tool to signal interest to peers (winks). The boost menu entry refers to an acceleration service able to give priority to certain subscribers' profiles and a messenger functionality provides a direct communication channel to peers.
From an abstract standpoint, an ODP could be truly defined as a matching engine. Applications of matching problems have been studied in science since early 1930s with the so called college admission problem [2] . Results in matching theory are often concerned with the existence of stable matchings and algorithms to obtain them.
In this paper, we are interested in a different problem: our question is rather when the activity level of ODP's subscribers is sufficient to sustain the operations of the platform. ODPs can function only if they have a sufficient number of active subscribers, i.e., those who take actions on the platform and contact potential partners. But, such activity has a cost. Chances to get in contact with potential mates increase with ODP's reach and visibility tools: in turn, those require the payment of a fee to the platform owner, e.g., enabling chats, messaging, etc.
Thus, the amount of active subscribers depends on the price they pay and on the attention they attain from their potential mates. Ultimately, the activity level of the platform connects to revenues generated for the platform owner.
Because of such mutual activation process, we model the ODP dynamics as an epidemic process in a bipartite graph corresponding to the two groups of potential mates. In this game, users of each group may decide how many of the platform's features use in order to increase their reach and visibility at a cost. We investigate the existence of equilibria Figure 1 : The subscriber dashboard of an online dating service platform. Observe in the uppermost part of the image the set of tools available to the customer: a search engine to explore profiles, a subscrbers' profile boost tool, platform-based emails, a tool to track own profile views and a messenger.
for the resulting game. The paper's structure is as follows. In Sec. III we propose an epidemic spreading process on a bipartite graph to model the activation process dynamics. In Sec. IV we describe the game model and derive the structure of Nash equilibria. The strategic model is extended in Sec. V to account for strategic pricing at the platform owner side using a Stackelberg game. Finally, Sec. VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Potential mates of the ODP system form two groups of nodes, namely females and males, V n , n = 1, 2 where |V n | = K n is the number of subscribers of each group. For the sake of notation, we denote n as the opposite of group n, i.e., when n = 1 then n = 2, and when n = 2 then n = 1, respectively. Since contacts occur only between the two groups, we use a complete bipartite graph to represent the potential contacts between the two groups.
Each individual of the two groups of subscribers can be either active or inactive. A user is defined as active if he/she can perform actions such as browsing others' profile or contacting others. Moreover, we assume that only an active user may take the initiative to contact the others. The state of each individual i in group n is a binary random variable X (i) n taking value 1 if the individual is active on the ODP or 0 if inactive.
An active user of group n becomes inactive after an exponentially distributed time with rate µ n > 0, n = 1, 2. An active user can activate an inactive user by browsing her/his profile and/or attempting to contact him/her (in ODPs this signal can be an email sent offline). We assume that, being contacted or browsed in profile, a member of group n is induced to perform some action on the ODP platform. Hence, he becomes active if he is inactive.
In order to model the action of an active user, we assume that an active individual explores the profiles of individuals in the opposite group according to a Poisson process. And, we let (i) nn > 0 be the rate at which each active member i of group n makes contact to members of group n, e.g., by browsing their profiles or making direct contact through the ODP platform.
Overall, this process is described by the probability of individual i in group n being active, p (i) n (t) = P (X (i) n (t) = 1) which also implies that the probability of being inactive is
The underlying model is a continuous-time Markovian SIS model: as in the SIS model, a user can be repeatedly active, inactive and yet active again. Formally, the state of a node is thus described by a stochastic process of Bernoulli type X i (t). At time t we let X i (t) = 0 if i is inactive and X i (t) = 1 if i is active.
We further assume that activation and inactivation processes of all nodes are independent [3] . The rate a member of group n contacts/activates a member of group n is nn > 0 times per second.
As described in [3] , [4] , the SIS process developing on a graph with N nodes is actually a continuous-time Markov process with 2 N states. The dynamics of the nodal infection probability is derived by Kolmogorov differential equations. But, the resulting dynamical system consists of 2 N linear differential equations: directly solving those is not a viable approach for large networks. An alternative first order meanfield approximation is the NIMFA approach proposed by Van Mieghem et al. in [3] , [4] .
As a result, an activation signal is exchanged across the two groups in bipartite fashion: individuals of group n cannot activate individuals of the same group, but, they can activate individuals of the opposite group n.
Individuals can increase the rate at which they become visible to the members of the opposite group. E.g., they can either use ODP functionalities such as messaging potential mates, they can browse more frequently becoming visible to their peers, or they can pay to make their profile more visible through acceleration features (boost). Doing so, they control the rate at which they are activated by members of the other group at a cost. 1 We are referring to a monetary cost for the sake of simplicity. Observe that a more general setting could include possibly the budget of attention customers need to devote to be active on the ODP.
Depending on the amount of resources spent, each user will be able to reach more potential mates and become more visible: this generates a trade off between the aim of being contacted and the resources (time, money) spent in order to do so. Observe that the utility obtained by using a certain strategy will depend on the actions of members of the opposite group and of the same group as well. Actually, this provides a classic framework for the activation game proposed in the next section.
III. GAME MODEL
The activation ODP game is defined as usual by players, strategies and utilities:
• Players: each member of the two groups of nodes V n , n = 1, 2;
• Strategies: the rate (h) nn at which individual h of group n attract the attention of members of group n;
• Utility: for an individual of group n it is an increasing function of the probability p n of being activated minus the cost to obtain attention.
In the rest of the paper we assume that players have perfect information on the system's state and on the other players' strategies. We can consider the general SIS model proposed in [3] :
is a SIS type of epidemic equation developed within the NIMFA model framework. Such meanfield approximation corresponds to the Markovian dynamics introduced in the previous section. In our context, the original system requires a complete system of 2 N linear differential equations, N = K 1 + K 2 . But, NIMFA represents a first order approximation of SIS dynamics over a network: it requires that the infectious state of two nodes in the network are uncorrelated, namely
Doing so, the original system is replaced by N non-linear differential equations (1) .
Here, (h) nn is a constant, we can resort to the notion of metastable epidemic state. Implicitly, we are assuming that the time horizon is large enough to consider the metastable state of the resulting SIS system. Actually, when the time horizon T is large enough, the meanfield approximation of the system (1) is driven into the quasi-stationary distribution [5] of the nodes' state, i.e., to the infection probability distribution denoted p 1 in [3] . With some abuse of notation, in the rest of the paper, we will denote p 1 = p for notation's sake.
Overall, there are two possible solutions for the system (1): the all zero absorbing state and the non-zero quasi-stationary one when the system is above the epidemic threshold [3] .
A. Homogeneous Nash Equilibria
For analytic tractability, in the rest of the paper we restrict our analysis to the case when individuals of the two groups adopt the same strategy and characterize equilibria under such assumption.
Once we dropped the user's index we can consider the following governing dynamics:
In particular, the system (2) has a non trivial solution only if Perron eigenvalue
where ⇢ n := K n nn /µ n , equivalently if and only if ⇢ 1 ⇢ 2 > 1. Otherwise, the trivial zero solution is the unique asymptotically stable restpoint for the original system. For notation's sake,
The condition can hence be resumed as Proposition 1 (Epidemic Threshold). The system (1) has a non trivial quasi-stationary probability distribution if and only if
In order to avoid degenerate cases, in the rest of our discussion, we need to assume that ⇢ max 1 ⇢ max 2 > 1. Above the threshold, the unique solution of (2) writes
from which the utilitỹ
where the linear cost term n := n µ n /K n is including the normalization term for notation's sake. Using standard game theoretical settings, we assume that each individual of the two groups acts in order to maximize their own utility. The actual utility writes
where [x] + = max{0, x}, because ⇢ n = 0 leads to the die out of the epidemic according to (3), resulting in utility zero.
In order to proceed further we need to find the maximum of (5), and then apply the results to find the best response and Nash equilibria, with some care for the case whenS n < 0. Actually, one can differentiate (5) for a fixed strategy of player n, and obtain the best response of player n. The best response is determined by maximizing the utility of a player for a fixed opponent's strategy ⇢ n
Now, a direct calculation shows that
Hence, b ⇢ n maximizes (5). However, the limit of ⇢ n  ⇢ max n and whether the condition for the epidemic to spread out are both ignored.
In order to perform the analysis of the possible Nash equilibria, we need to determine the best response ⇢ ⇤ of player n to the opponent's strategy ⇢ n . We report here the simplest form of the best response result, which provides the results useful for the following derivations; a more detailed description is reported in the Appendix.
Taking into account the constraint for strategy 0  ⇢ n  ⇢ max n , and the epidemic threshold condition (3) Proposition 2. The best response of subscribers of group n:
Proof. i. If ⇢ n = 0 we already found that ⇢ ⇤ n = 0. Hence, let us assume that ⇢ n > 0: the condition ⇢ ⇤ n = 0 is equivalent to state b ⇢  0. But, for n < 1, it follows 1 + ⇢ 1 n  n which leads to a contradiction with the fact that ⇢ n > 0. Conversely, if n 1, it must hold ⇢ n > 1/( n 1). ii. Follows directly from the condition b ⇢  ⇢ max n , whereas iii. is the complementary case of ii. Finally, we need to enforce (3) into conditions ii. and iii. in order to let the system above the epidemic threshold.
In the next section we analyze the Nash equilibria resulting from the game.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIA
The Nash equilibria of the game can be resumed by the following results where we distinguish between interior and extremal Nash equilibria. In particular, the first result is about extremal Nash equilibria, i.e., those where one of the players adopts either ⇢ n = 0 or ⇢ n = ⇢ max n . Interior Nash equilibria are those which are not extremal.
Theorem 1 (Extremal Nash Equilibria). Extremal Nash equilibria are as follows: Type i. s = (0, 0) is always a Nash equilibrium. Type ii. If 1 , 2 < 1, an extremal Nash equilibrium exists in the form
if and only if
1, no such Nash equilibrium exists. Type iii. A Nash equilibrium in the form
exists iff n , n < 1 and
If n < 1 and n 1, the additional condition is required
If n 1, no such Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. Type i. It is easy to verify that zero is always a Nash equilibrium: in fact, any unilateral deviation does not increase p n , but incurs a positive cost. Type ii. It requires a direct verification for the condition b ⇢ n > ⇢ max n to hold; in the case when n > 1, n = 1, 2, the negative result comes from Prop. 2, case i. Type iii. Similar to the previous two cases: the last two conditions require again to impose the conditions implied by Prop. 2, case i. We further observe that
is equivalent to the condition ⇢ max 1 ⇢ max 2 > 1. Clearly, because the best response to ⇢ n = 0 is ⇢ n = 0, no equilibrium of the type ⇢ n = 0 and ⇢ n > 0, n = 1, 2 is possible.
However, interior Nash equilibria cannot always be derived for (2).
Theorem 2 (Interior Nash Equilibria). The following two cases hold: i. If n > 1 for either n = 1 or n = 2 or both, no interior Nash equilibrium is possible. ii. If n  1 for n = 1, 2, and
at most a unique interior Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. i. By writing the condition for the interior Nash equilibrium 0 < ⇢ n < ⇢ max n , n = 1, 2, we obtain simply
The above relation proves that no Nash equilibrium is possible if n > 1 for either n = 1 or n = 2. ii. The bounds in (8) force an interior Nash equilibrium. We Figure 2 : Interior Nash Equilibria: a unique interior Nash is possible when n  1, zn p n, n = 1, 2.
further observe that an interior Nash must solve the following system
under the constraint 0 < ⇢ n < ⇢ max n . The same system can be conveniently rewritten by replacing z n := q ⇢n ⇢n+1 , where we hence obtain the equivalent one
Solutions z n of (9) exists if f (z n ) = (1 z 2 n ) 2 and the parametric line y := n n p n z n intersect for 0 < z n < 1. It can be showed that the solution of (9) always exists: it actually corresponds to graphically, as depicted in Fig. 2 . The fact that it is unique is not proved here for the sake of space but it can be derived by simple arguments on the derivatives of the curves depicted in Fig. 2 .
In order to exist, the interior Nash equilibrium should also , n = 1, 2, which also writes z n > p n , n = 1, 2. Remark 1. We can resume the above results saying that the ODP activation game has at most two Nash equilibria. It always has at least one Nash equilibrium, i.e., the null Nash equilibrium. In addition, a non null Nash equilibrium is possible depending on the range of parameters n , n = 1, 2. Furthermore, such equilibrium is extremal and unique when either one of n 1. When n < 1 for n = 1, 2, the equilibrium is an interior one.
V. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
We now assume the ODP owner acts such in a way to generate the largest possible revenue from active users. In order to do so, the platform owner can act on the price subscribers pay.
The pricing determines the revenue generated by charging subscribers who make use of system features, i.e., the tools made available in order to enhance users' reach and visibility. E.g., acceleration features are customary in ODPs, however a cost has to be paid in order to appear higher in the recommendation list seen by potential mates. The strategic interaction between the platform owner and the two groups of subscribers is a hierarchical game where actions occur sequentially: first prices are decided by the platform owner, and then subscribers decide how much they make use of optional system features.
The natural framework to model this strategic interaction is the notion of a Stackelberg game [6] , where the platform owner, i.e., the leader, makes the first move. In this framework, it settles ( 1 , 2 ), i.e., the cost paid by a customer of each group in order become more visible using the acceleration tools.
The two groups react, as followers, and attain a certain Nash equilibrium. The ODP owner utility is thus determined by the pair ⇢ n ( n , n ), n = 1, 2, i.e., the followers' response to the leader setting the service platform costs.
Hence, we study the Stackelberg equilibrium where the leader aims at solving the following problem
where maximizing (10) corresponds to maximizing the profit of the platform owner. In order to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium, we have to determine the optimal cost pair: to do so we analyze the utility based on the type of Nash equilibria induced by the leader's move.
Remark 2. Typically, a well-posed Stackelberg problem (10) requires a unique Nash to be induced onto the follower(s) by the leader's move. However, in our case (10) is well posed because of two facts:
i. At most two Nash equilibria exist and the null Nash equilibrium is always a solution: however, above the critical threshold, i.e., ⇢ 1 ⇢ 2 > 1, the corresponding equilibrium for the meanfield dynamics is known to be unstable; conversely, the non-null Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable [7] ; ii. From the results in Thm. 2 and Thm. 1, we know that a bijection exists between the pairs ( 1 , 2 ) and the corresponding non-zero Nash equilibria.
The two properties above motivate further analysis of the Stackelberg equilibria. We start discussing the possible cases in the following, enumerating the possible induced Nash equilibria. Type i. Cost pairs inducing the null Nash equilibrium only, i.e., ⇢ n = 0, n = 1, 2, correspond to S p = 0, and cannot be optimal. Actually, the leader can always find a strategy that is better off: as seen in the following case ( 1 , 2 ) can be always chosen in order to induce a Nash equilibrium with positive utility.
Type ii. For the case of equilibria of type two, the utility of the platform owner writes
under the constraints n  1+⇢ max
Hence, the maximum is
which corresponds to the platform owner utility for the cost values attaining equality in the constraint. Type iii. We consider equilibria of the type b ⇢ 1 , ⇢ max 2 for the sake of simplicity. Here, the leader chooses the cost pair in the set where the constraints in Thm. 1 hold. The form of the utility is in this case:
By replacing the expression for b
, and maximizing for 2 as from the constraint in Thm.1 we can recognize that the maximum of S b is indeed attained for
Note that based on Thm.1, we need to assume 1 < 1, so that 2 < 1 as well from the previous expression. This rules out the case 2 
1.
We can thus derive the expression for the utility as a function of the cost of group V 1 only, namely,
It is possible to see that the absolute maximum of such function is attained at
Hence, based on the constraints described in Thm. 1 there are three cases determined by the relative position of b 1 with respect to the interval [ e 1 1 ] where a fixed arbitrarily small value. But, we recall that the bound 1 corresponds to the condition inf ⇢1 {⇢ 1 ⇢ max 2 } > 1. Induced Nash equilibrium of Type ii would indeed be better off, so that this case cannot correspond to a Stackelberg equilibrium. We can finally map the set of pairs ( 1 , 2 ) onto the most profitable extremal Nash equilibrium as a function of (⇢ max 1 , ⇢ max 2 ):
Finally, we have reported in Fig. 3 the map of the type of induced non zero Nash equilibria depending on ⇢ max i , i = 1, 2.
VI. RELATED WORKS
With respect to online dating platforms, most attention in literature has been attracted by sociological and psychological issues [8] , [9] . Despite those are out of the scope of our analysis, such considerations are indeed relevant to design ODP's matching mechanisms. Furthermore, users' preferences and profiles are crucial for the data mining process used in order to feed matching algorithms in online dating platforms. Conversely, a vast literature in computer science covers matching problems and design of matching algorithms starting from mutual interest of agents. The standard prototype of a matching algorithm is described in [2] .
Works related to ours are [10] , [11] . In [10] the focus is on the match-making algorithms based on machine learning techniques. Many features of ODPs are described in the seminal work [11] which reports on an early Internet dating community in Sweden. The authors perform a complex network analysis unveiling the typical topological traits derived from the relations within such platforms.
Diffusion of epidemic processes on graphs attracted the attention of the scientific community; the NIMFA model is described in both single and interconnected networks [3] [4] [12] . The general problem of approximation of a epidemic process via ODEs is discussed in several works, see for instance [13] .
Processes developing over bipartite graphs have been studied in literature before. The analysis of popularity for content diffused on bipartite networks has been carried out in [14] . The authors refer to the NetFlix's content distribution platform, where videos and users represent the partition of the graph.
To the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first work to provide a model based on the strategic interaction of actors in online dating platforms.
VII. CONCLUSIONS Our initial study of online dating platforms provides a novel perspective on the relation between the number of users and pricing of ODP's services. We have factored into our model the strategic interaction of ODP users, who try to attract the attention of potential mates at a cost settled by the platform owner. We have showed that reciprocal activation of the two groups introduces a SIS type of dynamics. Such dynamics settles a lower bound in the activation of platform's customers below which the system switches off.
Actually, because active users represent the source of revenue for ODPs, maintaining a large set of active subscribers is the main target of the platform owner. This work suggests several interesting research directions for the design and the pricing models for ODPs. The first immediate extension is including the presence of non group-homogeneous Nash equilibria for the game. Moreover, we have been studying the system under the customary assumption that players are rational and have perfect information on the structure of the game. Mechanism design and signaling games appear hence another extension that is worth exploring for the activation game.
